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[82 C.2d 53; 185 P.2d II

[Sac. No. 5758. In Bank. June 15, 1948.]

EMIL PALERMO, Respondent, v. STOCKTON THEATRES,
INC., Appellant.
[1] Statutes- Legislation by Reference or Adoption. - Where a
statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another
statut.e, regullltion or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and the repeal of the
pro'risions referred to does not affect the adopting statute, in
t.he absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary.
[2] ld.-Legislation by Reference or Adoption.-The rule as to
statutory adoption by specific reference to the provisions of
another statute applics to the adoption of statutes of another
jurisdiction and treaties.
[3] ld.-Legislation by Reference or Adoption.-Where a statute adopts by reference 0. system or body of laws or the
general law relating to the subject in hand, the statute takes
the law or laws referred to, not only in their contemporary
form, but also as they mey be changed from time to time, and
as they may be subjected to elimination by repeal.
[4] Alienage-Alien Land Law-Construction of Statute.-A provision in the Alien Land Law (Stats. 1921, p. lxxxiii, as
amended; 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 261) that aliens not
eligible to citizenship may occupy and use realty in the state
t.o the extent and for the purposes prescribed by "any treaty
now existing between the government of the United States
and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or
subject," refers to a specific treaty, and hence the abrogation
in 1940 of the treaty between the United States and Japan
did not affect the validity of the Alien Land Law, and a lease
of business property to a corporation, the capital stock of
which was principlllly owned.by nationals of Japan, was valid.
15] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construction in Favor of Constitutionality.-Where a statute is reasoD[1] See 23 Ca1.Jur. 685; 50 Am.Jur. 57.
[2] Sec 52 Am.Jur. SOi, 815.
[5] S<'(' 5 Cal.Jur. (j];j; ] ] Am.Jur. 729.
_ McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Statutes, §79; [4] Alienage, § 40;
!;ij Const.itutional Law, §48; [6,7,9,11] Alienage, §S6; (8]
Tl'eaties, § 6; (10) L:mdlord and Tenant, § 97; [12] Constitutional
Law,§41.
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ably susceptible of two constructions, that construction which
will uphold the statute is to be preferr('d to a construction
of doubtful validity.
[6] AlieJ:.ago-Alien Land Law-Validity.-Thc Alien Land Law
refers to treatics with the nations eom'('rned only as sueh
treaties existed Ilt the time of the passage of the act, dednres
the law of the Btnte :lDd not the provisions of tht: trent)' agreements between the United States and other nations, and is unafi'ectt:d, insofnr as it mny remain valid as a law of the state,
by abrogation or amendment of a treaty, and hence the act
docs not unconstitutionally delegate to the treaty-making authority of the United States the power to terminate or change
the aet.
{7] Id.-Alien Land Law-Nature of Legislation.-The Alien Land
Law is not tcmpornry or emergency h:gislation the operntive
effect of which, by reason of changed conditions, must be
deemed to hnve terminated of its own limitations, or which
should be declared obsolete becnuse to enforce it would be inequitable.
[8] Treaties-Duration.-The commercial treaty of April 5, 1911,
between {Tnited States and Jnpnn providing that the treaty
"shall enter into operation on the 17th of July, 1911 and <loall
remain in forcc twelve years or until the expiration of six
montbs from the date on which either of the Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other of its intention to
terminate," considered as municipal law, must be de(,Dled to
have heen permanent or perpetual.
[9] Alienage - Alien Land Law - ValiditY.-The silence of the
Legislature in the 1943 and 1945 amendmE'nts to the Alien Land
Law on the question of the effect of the abrogation of the
treaty with Japan seems to indicate its opinion that the abrogation had DO effect on the provisions of the act.
[10] Landlord and Tenant-Leases-Options to Purchase.-A lease
of business property to a corporation, the capital stock of which
was owned principally by nationals of Japan, was not invalid,
assuming that a provision giving the· corporation an option to
purchase the land was void insofar as it purported to confer
such right on a noneligible alien, since such provision was severable from other provisions of the lease and could not affect
the remaining and valid portions thereof.
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[11] Alienage-Alien Land Law-ValiditY.-The Alien Land Act
is not unconstitutional as infringing on the treaty-making
power of the federal government.
[12] Constitutional Law - Constitutionality of Statutes - AvoidAnce of Unnecessary Decisions.-A court will not decidc a con-
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stitutional question whrre other grounds arc available and
disposit.ive of fbI' il'll'lnl'5 of thl' ~nl'll'.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Joaquin County. M.. G. Woodward .•fudge. Reversed.
Action for declaratory relief.
reversed.

Judgment for plaintiff

Freed & Freed, Eli Freed, EmmettF. Gebauer, William F.
Cleary and Guy C. Cal den for Appellant.
Honey & Mayall, }4'orrest E. Macomber, A. B. Bianchi and
Garrett H. Elmore for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J .-In a suit for declaratory relief plaintiff
seeks to have adjudged violative of the California Alien Land
Act (Stats. 1921, p. lxuili, as amended; 1 Deering's Gen.
Laws, Act 261), and consequently void and of no effect, a
lease of commercial real property in California executed by
plaintiff's predecessor in int~rest, as lessor, to defendant corporation, as lessee. The defendant le&;ee corporation also is
the successor in interest of the lessees' rights, if any there be,
under a previously executed l('ase of the same property to certain Japanese nationals. The capital stock of defendant lessee
is and at all times concerned has been •• principally and almost
wholly" owned by nationals of Japan; i. e., by aliens not eligible to citizenship in this country.
Under the prm'isions of the Alien Land Act (§ 3), as
amended in 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 1021), the right to Jease, or
otherwise use or enjoy, real property in this state is granted
to such a corporation •• to the extent and for the purposes
prescribed by any treaty now existing between the . . . enited
States" and Japan. The trial court rendered judgment in
plaintiff-lessor's favor, declaring that the lease "is, and at all
times was, void," and defendant-lessee appealed. Following
decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversing the judgment, this court granted a hearing
for the purpose of giving further study to the problems presented and to consider in particular the question of a possible
infringement by the state statute upon the treaty powers of
the federal government. After such study we haye concluded
that the opinion of the Distriet Court of Appeal, prepared
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by Mr. Justice Peek, correctly treats ana disposes of all issul':)
essentially involved, and it is therefore, with further discus·
sion concerning the asserted conflict between state statut~
and federal treaty power, and comment as to a su~gested con·
stitutional pronouncement, adopted as the opinion of this
court. Such opinion (with appropriate deletions and additions
of introductory, conjunctive, and other pro forma matter as
indicated) is as follows:
., [ ] The record [ ] discloses [ ] the following [undisputed] facts:
"On January 3,1930, respondent's [plaintiff lessor's] predecessor leased to appellant's [defendant lessee's] predecessors,
who were nationals of Japan, certain premises situated in the
city of Stockton, California, for theater purposes for a term
of 10 years, commencing January 1, 1931, under the provisions
of the Alien Land Act of this state (Stats. 1921, p. lxxxiii, as
amended; 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 261), and in accordance
with the provisions of the commercial treaty which had been
concluded between the United States and Japan on April 5,
1911 (37 Stats. at L. 1504). On December 22,1934, respondent's predecessor gave the lessees an option for a term of 10
years longer than the term of the original lease. Said option
recited that it was given for a valuable consideration, and that
it was attached to and became a part of the coudition of said
lease. On January 16, 1935, the lessees, with the consent of
the lessor, transferred all their right, title and interest in said
lease and option to the appellant, a corporation, the capital
stock of which was almost wholly owned by nationals of Japan.
On January 26, 1940, the treaty between the United States
and Japan was abrogated. On February 14, 1940, appellant
served respondent's predecessor with a written notice of its
election to exercise said option for an additional term of 10
years, commencing January 1, 1941, and on September 13,
1940, pursuant to said option the parties entered into a written
agreement of lease for the additional term of 10 years. On
October 27, 1941, respondent's predecessor died, and rcspondent became the legal owner of the premi~ws in question.
"The record further discloses that on October 19, 1944.
respondent, who had been employed by appellant in the operation of the theater from 1936 to the time the present action
was filed, served on appellant a demand that the latter vacate
the premis('s forthwith, on th£' ground that thp occupancy
thereof by appellant was illegal under the provisions of the
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AIi<>n Land Act of California. On November 20, 1944, the
pr(>F;t:'llt action waF; brought by respondent to have the rights
IIf tht:' pllrtil,x ndjudjl'atrd.
"TIl(' tt·jal court found gencrally in favor of respondent,
:l1Id particlllarly t.hat the leasl:' of Scptember 13, 1940, was
'pnrtinll.v It new Lease and partially an ntcllsion of the preexisting Lt'usc,' that no notice of appellant 'selection to exercise the option was served on respondent's predecessor until
P~brllary 14, 1940,. which \Vat; subsequent to the termination
of the treaty between the United States and Japan, and that,
\v.ltilc there was no proof of a conspiracy to violate the law,
tht' said lease was void and of no force or effect whatsoever.
In n written memorandum of decision the trial court predicated its holding on the ground that the treaty removed the
lease from the operation of the California statute and that in
the absence of a treaty, a japanese alien cannot enter into a
lease of commercial property in the State of California.
"While other issues were raised in the proceedings in the
trial court and are argued in the briefs on appeal, the basic
qu('stion on which the correctness of the judgment herein
turns is the effect of the abrogation of the treaty between the
United States and Japan on the permissive provisions of the
.Alien Land Act with respect to the right of a corporation in
which a majority of the issued capital stock is owned by noneligible aliens of Japanese nationality to acquire or enjoy an
interest in real property in tbis state which could have been
acquired or enjoyed under the terms of said treaty.
, 'The pertinent provisions of the act in question, sections
1, 2 and 3 of the Alien Land Law (1 Deering's Gen. Laws,
Act 261), as adopted by the electorate of this state in 1920.
nnd thereaft.er [pursuant to permission contained in § 13 of
th(' initiative act] amended by t.he act of the Legislature approved ,June 20, 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 1021), and as they read
at the time hE'rein involvcd, provided as follows:
.. 'I. An aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of
thp United States mny acquire, possellS, enjoy, use, cultivate,
occupy, transfer, transmit and inherit real property, or any
lnh'rE'st therein, in this state, and have in whole or in part
tilC bcn<.>ficial use thereof, in the same manner and to the same
f'xtE'nf. as citizens of the United States, except as otherwise
pro\'idpd by the laws of thiR 8tnt<.> .
.. '2. All aliens other tltan tllo1'\(> mentioned in section one
of thix aet may acquire, PO!'l.'I(,RS, rnjoy, use, cultivate, occupy
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and tran;.;f(·r rcal property, or any interest th~rein. JIJ t ltill
Idati', and ha\'(' in whole or in part th~ beneficial Use tll\'l"I·"f.
in the l1lann!!!" and to the extent, and for the purpose~ prE.'seribed by any treat.y now existing bet weeD the government of
the United States and the nation or country of which such
alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise.
" '3. Any company, association or corporation organized
under the laws of this or any other state or union, of which a
majority of the members are aliens other than those specified
in section oue of this act, or in which a majority of the issued
capital stock is owned b~' such aliens, may acquire, possess,
enjoy, lise, cultivate. ol'eupy aud transfer real property, or any
interest therein, in this state, aud have in whole or in part
the beneficial use thereof, in the manner and to the extent aud
for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing bet,ween the government of the United States and tIle nation or
country of which such members or stockholders are citizen!!
or subjects, and not otherwise. Hereafter all aliens other than
those specified in section one hereof may become members of
or acquire shares of stock in any COmpany, as;.;ociation or corporation that is or may be authorized to acquire, possess, enjoy, use, cultivate, occupy and transfer real property, or any
interest therein, in this state, in the manner and to the extent
and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing
between the government of the United States and the nation
or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not
otherwi;.;e. '
"Likc\vise the pertinent provisions of article I of the Treaty
of April 5, 1911, between the United States and Japan pro\>ided in part:
" 'The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting
Parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the
territories of the other to carry on trade. wholesale and retail,
to own or lease and occupy hOllses, manufactories, warehouses
nllll shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for
r(';.;illential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms
as nath'e citizens or subjects, submitting themseh·eg to the
laws and regulations there established.'
[1] "It is a wen established principle of statutory law
that, where a statute adopts hy sp('cifi~ reference the provisions
of another statute, rl'!!nlation. or ordinance, such provisions
are incorporated in the form in which they exist at tile time
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of the refpr('n('(' anu not as snhscquC'lIt ly mod ifil'll, lind I hat
the r('peal of tll(' provisions rcf(>rreo to d()I's not alT(~!'t the
adoptin~ stalulC', in the abs(>nce of a e1rarly ('Xpri'ss('() intention to the eontrary. (Rancho Santa Anita v. Cily of At'cadia
[1942],20 Cal.2u 319.322 [125 P.2d 4751 ; Bro('k v. Supcrior
Court [19371. ~ Ca1.2d 291, 297-298 171 P.2d 209, 114 A.L.R.
127]; In re Bllrl.. e [19231, 190 Clll. 326. :~2i-328 !212 P.
193]; Don v. Pfister [1!H61. 172 Cal. 25.28.31 [155 P. 60];
Ramish v. Har'fwell [189!)], 126 Cal. 443. 447 [58 P. 920] ;
Ventura COllnt1l v. Clay f18961, 112 Cal. 65. 72 [44 P. 488] ;
People v. CZ.unie [1886], 70 Cal. 504, 506 [11 P. 775] ; People
v. Whipple [1874}, 47 Cal. 592.593-594; SprinfT Volley Wafer
W OrliS v. San Francisco [1863], 22 Cal. 434, 439; 59 C.J.
§ 548, p. 937.)
[2] "This principle applies to the adoption of a statute of
another juris(liction (Brock v. Superior C01lrt. supro. at page
297; 111 re Burke, supra, at page 328); and inasmuch as
treaties bave the force and effect of fedl'ra) statutes (52 Am.
Jur. §§ 4,17, pp. 807. 815), it r ] [sf'ems reasonable to hold]
that it applies to a treaty to the same extent that it would to
an art of Congress.
[3] "It also [ ] [mnst] be noted that there is a cognate
rule, recognized as applicable to many easf'S, to the effect that
where the reference is general instead of specific, such as a
r!'ference to a system or body of laws or to the general law
rplating to the subject in hand, the rl'f('rrillg statute takes
tl!e law or laws referred to not only in their contemporar~'
form, but also as they may be changed from time to time, and
(it may be a~sumed although no such case has come to our at·
trntion) as they may be subjected to elimination altog-cthcr by
repeal. (Kirk v. Rhoads f1893] , 46 Cal. 398, 403; BoTton
v. Terra Bella Irr. Dist. [1930), 106 Cal.App. 313. 322 [28!'l
P. 678] ; Thoits v. Byxbee [1917], 34 Cal.App. 226, 231 [167
P. 166]; 50 Am.Jur. 58-59; 59 C.J., § 624, pp. 1060-1061.
And see Valle.fo etc. R. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co. [1918], 177
Cal. 249, 254 [170 P. 426].)
[4, 5] "The question whether the reference to the treaty
contained in the California Land Act should b{' deemed specific or genl'ral within thl' n1f'aning of tIle foregoing rules
mig_ht, as an au-tract proposition, admit of differ<.'nt opinions.
TIll' language is 'any treaty now l'xisting between the governInput of the Ullited Rtalt',: :111(1 tll(' nation or country of whieh
such alien is a citizell or sl,bjcct.' However, in view of the
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fact that there is grln'e doubt whet her our Legislat.ure could
constitutionally delegate to the trE'aty-maldng authority of
the UnitE'd States thE' ri,:rht and power thn!'; dir('ctly to control our local legislation wit h r('spE'ct to futnrE' acts (Rancho
Santa Anita v. City of Arcadia. supra. at pagE' 319, 322:
Brock v. Superior COllrt, supra. at page 297: In re Burke.
supra, at pages 328-329), we are constrained to bold that the
refE'rE'nce is specific and not general. since such a construction ill at least a reasonable one (See flnJ re Heath [1891),
144 U.S. 92, 93-95 [12 S.Ot. 615, 36 L.Ed. 358}) and therefore
to be preferred to one of doubtful validity (11 Am.Jur. § 97,
pp.729-730; Alattheu:s v. Matthews f1925], 240 N.Y. 28 f147
N.E. 237, 239. 38 A.L.R. 1079J).
" According to the text of the former of these two last cited
authoritiE's. 'The duty of the courts so to construe a statute
as to save its constitutionality when it is reasonably susceptible of two constrnctions includE's the duty of adopting a
construction tbat will not subject it to a succE'ssion of doubts
as to its constitutionality, for it is well settled that a statute
must be construed, if fairly possiblE', so as to avoid not only
the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubt
upon that score.'
"In the case last cited, the New York Court of Appeals
said: 'A like duty requires us to avoid a constrnction which
raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions if the
statute can reasonably be construed so as to avoid such questions. '
"The conclusion which tbis construction leads to, viz.,
that the Alien Land Act incorporated the then-existing provisions of the treat~· and retained them after the treaty was
abrogated, suggests a somewhat similar situation which apparently existed in some of the states whell the Volstead Act
[41 U.S. Stats. at L., p. 305]. the provisions of which many
local prohibition laws either adopted or copied, was repealed.
(See, AnnotatIOn, 88 A.L.R. 1365-1369.) It seems that thl'
general view was that the repeal did not automatically effect
a terminatiollof the local law. In our own state the question
was not presented, for the Wright Act {Stats. 1921, p. 79]
was repealed [Stats. 1933, p. lxxxviii] prior to the repeal of
the federal act; yet the decisions of our courts leave little
doubt that had this not been dOlle the state law would have
remaincd unaffected by the rep.'al of the national law.
(People v. Pagni [1924], 69 Cal.App. 94, 98-99 [230 P. 1001] ;

June 1!J-l8]

PALERMO 1'. STOCKTON TBJo:ATRF:S,
[32 C.2d 53; 195 P.2d 11

INC.

61

/"'0/,1, \'. lrlJlJrl [19281.88 Cal.App. 621, 623 [2(;4 r. 2!l8];
11l rc Volpi [EI21l. 53 Cal.App. 229 [199 P. 1090]. An(l spp
In Te Bur!.·c, supra, at pages :128-329.)
.. Another interpstillg example of a reference statute is thp
so-ca11('u Assilllilative Crimes Aet which embodies section 468

[title 18] United States Code, and which, as enacted in
1898 (30 Stats. 717), proyiucd in effect that a crime committed
ill a place over whidl the United States had exclusive
jllrisuictioll was punishable in the same way and to the saml'
extent as it was punishable under the law of the state, territor~- or district within the territorial limits of which it was
committed, and that 'every such State, Territorial, or District
law shall, for the purposes of this section, continue in force,
notwithstanding any subsequent repeal or amendment thereof
by any such Statp. Territory, or District.'
"I n construing saio section of the act, the United States
Supreme Court has helo that the reference therein was to the
Jaw of the state, territory. or district only as such law existed
at thl' time of thp passagl' of the act (United States v. Press
f'ublishil1g Co. [1910], 219 U.S. 1, 9-10 f31 S.Ct. 212, 55
L.Ed. 65]), that said seetio!1 was designeo and served to enforce feopral law and not the law of a state, territory, or
di~tri('t (Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. rI937], 302 U.S. 253, 266
[:;8 S.Ct. ]67, 82 L.Ed. 235]), and that, inasmuch as the fedpral law would not be responsive to changes in the law of the
state. tl'rritory. or district, whether they should occur by way
of repeal or amendment; said section could not properly be
t 1"l'JIled
to constitute an unlawful attempt to delegate to
IMar lawmakers the power to work a change in the federal
law (Franklin v. United States [1909], 216 U.S. 559, 568-569
I:W S.Ct. 434, 54 L.Ed. 615]).
[6] "IJikewisl', it may be said that the California Alien Land
A('1 refers to treaties with the nations concerned only as
s1l<·h treaties existed at the time of the passage of thp act (or
of the aJllPndments contaiuing the same reference), that said
:10'\ declares the law of the state and not the proyisions of
the treaty a~reements between the United States and said nations, and that, being unaffected [insofar as it may remain
\'alid as a law of the state] by the abrogation or amendment
of a tr('aty, sai d act does not unconstitutionally delegate to
VI(> treatY-llIaking' authority of the United States the power to
terlllinate or change the law of our state.
''It should be noted that the section mentioned was sub-
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stantially amended in 1943 [Stats. 1943, chs. 1003, ]0591.
However. it was not such an amendment as would afl'ect our
discnssion of the question here presenteo.
"Of course if there were an express provision in the Alien
Land Act which unmistakably made the duration of the local
provisions coterminous with those of the treaty. such a provision would have to be given effeet aecording to its tenor
and validity. An example of that kind of a provision is found
in section 71 of title 8 of the United States Code [24 Stats.
4761. dealing with the subject of alien ownership of land.
The language of that section is:
" •The prohibition of this section shall not apply to cases
in which the right to hold or dispose of lands in the United
States is secured by existing treaties to citizens or subjects
of foreign countries, which rights, so far as they may exist
by force of any such treaty, shall continue to exist so long as
such treaties are in force, and no longer.'
.. The fact that similar language was not used by our Legislature may be thought to constitute some evidence of the fact
that such a result was not intended.
[7] ., Neither is this a case of temporary or emergency legislation the operative effect of which, by reason of changed conditions, mnst be deemed to have terminated of its own limitations or which should be declared obsolete because to enforce
it would be inequitable. (Sec for example Nashville etc. R. 00.
v. Walters [1934], 294 U.S. 405, 415 [55 S.Ct. 486. 79 L.Ed.
949J; O. K. Ohastleton Oorp. v. Sinclair [1923],264 U.S. 543.
547-548 [44 S.Ct. 405,68 L.Ed. 841].) [8] The treaty of April
5, 1911, was not of a temporary character, particularly at the
time it was readopted in sections 2 and 3 of the Alien Land
Act by the amendment of 1923. The duration provisions of
the treaty were contained in article XVII, whicb read as
follows:
" 'The present Treaty shall enter into operation on the 17th
of July, 1911, and shall remain in force twelve years or until
the expiration of six months from the date on which either
of the Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other
of its intention to terminate the Treaty.
"'In case neither of the Contracting Parties shall have
given notice to the other six months before the expiration of
the said period of twelve years. of its intention to terminate
the Treaty, it shall continuE:' operative until the expiration
of six months from the date on which either Party shall have
given such notice.'

)

I

June ]948]

PALERMO V. STOCK'I'ON TnEATR"S, TNC.

C3

53: 195 P.2d
------_132.._C.2d.._-.---l]

.. It is apparent that Ill!' t "('aty C'onsidpred as nl\lll i(·jpal
law mllst be det'!n('d to have hpPIl pPJ'Jllanent or pcrrwll1al.
(25 R.C.L. §§ 10 anfl 11, p. 76:i. BpI', Hlso. 50 Am .•Jur.
§§ 513-515, pp. G24, 325.)
"Nor is there anything in the sit.uation here which would
deprive the respondent of any constitutional right if the law
as it originally read were deemed to haye becn contilllled in
effect subsequent to January 26, 1940 l tbe date of the treaty
abrugation]. And in the absence of a constitutional objl'ction
it is generally held that the courts have no right to declare
a statute obsolete by reason of a supervening change in the
conditions under whicb it was enacted. (Benson v. Hunter
[1921], 23 Ariz. 132 [202 P. 233, 234J; McKeown v. State
[1939], 197 Ark. 454 [124 S.W.2d 19, 22-23] ; Corn Exchange
Sav. Bk. v. Smith [1931], 59 S.D. 182 [239 N.W. 186, 189,
78 A.L.R. 800J; Gulf Refining Co. v. Oity of Dallas (Tex.
Civ.App. [1928]), 10 S.W.2d 151, 159. See, also, Painless
Parker v. Board of Dental Exam. [19321, 216 Cal. 285, 299
[14 P.2d 67J.)
[9] "Finally, the fact that, when amending the Alien
Land Act in 1943 and again in 1945, the Legislature was
silent on the question of tbe effect of tbe abrogation of the
treaty on corresponding provisions of the statute, seems to
indicate in the opinion of that body that no change was
effected. This is particularly true in view of the fact that tbis
act is a definite exercise of the police power expressed by tbe
people and the Legislature of this state [ ] [Mott v. Cline
(1927), 200 Cal. 434, 446-447 [253 P. 718]]. However reluctantly such power may have been exercised in favor of
lloneligible aliens, once it was exercised its intended scope and
effect within the defined limits were given liberal interpretation by our courts. (See State of Oalifornia v. Tagami
[(1925), 195 Cal. 522 (234 P. 102)] at pages 529-532.) This
accords also with the [ ] view expressed in the decisions
that particularly in respect of matters within the police power
the action of the state is ordinarily independent of that of
the federal government. (People v. Pagni, supra, at page 99
[of 69 Cal.App.J ; People v. Wood, supra, at page 625 [of 88
Cal.App.] .)
"Since we bave concluded that the abrogation of the treaty
haa no effect on the provisions of the Alien Land Act, it is
obvious that the lease of September 13, 1940, was valid irre·
spective of such abrogation. It is unnecessary, therefore, to
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('ollsid'T \\'h:ll dT""1 011 \'l'sl,·.! (lr ""IJ1illg('lll rights the rcpr.1!
or anJllll11Jf'llt of thosr 1'1"()\"isioll~ wonkl 1111\'(' hnd, nor th!"
cxtl'llt to ",hidl a pri\'alp illdivi(llIal as distinguished from
the state would }Ja\"e hHd tl)(· right 10 tak(' atlnmtagt' of snch
repeal or annulmcnt, or qurstions l'ollct'rning estoppel 011 tht'
part of this respondent to attack the validity of the lease.
[10] "We may notice. howcver, 011(' oth('1' rpClS()ll assignect by
respondent for holding the lease invalid, viz., th(' fact that
said lease contains an option provision permitting the lessee
to purchase the property demised. [ ] [Even if we assume that] this provision is void insofar as it purports to
confer any such right on a noneligible alien, it is clearly a
severable part of tht' lease ana its yalidity could not affect
the remaining and valid portions thereof. (ill ott v. Cline
[supra], 200 Cal. 434, 450 [253 P. 718]; [see, also, Spaulding
v. Yovino-¥ounn (1947), 30 Ca1.2d 138, 141 (180 P.2d
691)].)"
[11] Plaintiff-lessor has particularly urged before this
court that to construe the statute's reference to the treaty
as being specific rather than general renders the act
unconstitutional because with such a construction the act
infringes upon and embarrasses the treaty-making power of
the United States government, for the reason that Japan
would not enter into a llt'W treaty which gives it "lesser rights
than thos«:> now given by the frozen state laws." Subsequent
to our granting a hearing in this case, the Suprem«:> Court
of the United States, in Clark v. Allen (1947), 331 U.S. 503
[67 S.Ct. 1431,91 L.Ed. 1633, 1638,170 A.L.R. 953], rejected
a similar cont«:>ntion with reference to section 259 of the
California Probate Code. It was there held that although
under the provisions of the state law the right of a nonresident
alien to take property in California by will or succession depends upon a reciprocal right of United States residents and
citizens to take property ill such alien's country, and although
the existence of such a reciprocal right depends in part at
least upon treaties between the government of the United
States and that of the particular foreign country involved, the
California statut.e is "not unconstitutional as an el.tension
of state power into a field of foreign affairs exclusively reserved to the federal government, and that California had
not entered into the forbidden domain of negotiating with
a foreign country or of making a compact with it contrary
to article I, section 10, of the federal COllstitution." (l<:sfalt
uf Knutzen (1948), 31 Ca1.2d 573, 577 l191 1'.2d 747 J ;
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al:-:o I~'stalc v} R('I'illl(''lI/I' (1!J1.'i), :\ I C'al.:.!u ;)~O, ;,ii~
1191 1'.211 7!l2J.) Wt· hold tilt' sarllt· 10 he 1flU' of the Cali·
forllia Alien Land Ad as eOl1strll('d hl'l'einabove; hener we
need not consider other as<.;erted weaknesses in plaintiff's
argument on this phase of the case.
[12] It has been suggested that this case could bt' used as
a vehicle for reexamining the earli{'r rulings of the United
States Supreme Court and of this court holding constitutional
the basic provisions of the Alien Land Act (see e.g., We/)u v.
O'Brien (1923), 263 U.S. 313, 322 [44 S.Ct. 1l2, 68 L.Ed.
318, 321J; Porterfield v. Webb (1923),263 U.S. 225,233 [44
S.Ct. 21, 68 L.Ed. 278, 281] ; Mott v. Cline l1927), 200 Cal.
434,445 [253 P. 718J ; In re Y. Akado (1922), 188 Cal. 739,
743 [207 P. 245]; Frick v. Webb (1923),263 U.S. 326, 333
144 8.0t. 115, 68 L.Ed. 323, 325-326] ; Cockrill v. California
(1924),268 U.S. 258 [45 S.Ct. 490, 69 L.Ed. 944, 946-947];
see also People v. Oyama (1946), 29 OaL2d 164 [173 P.2d
794 J and cases there cited; Oyama v. California (1948), 332
U.S. 633 [68 8.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. - - ) ; Terrace v.
Thompson (1923), 263 U.S. 197 [44 8.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255,
272); United States v. Fo:r (1876), 94 U.S. 315 [24 L.Ed.
192]), that we should reverse our previous holdings and
dispose of this case by ruling that" the statute here involved
is clearly unconstitutional, and should, therefore, be stricken
down. " Weare of the view that this issue, lmnecessary to
the decision, should not be decided here or made the subject
of a dictum. It has heretofore been considered against the
policy of this court (and of courts of last resort generally)
to reach out and unnecessarily pronounce upon the constitutionality of any duly enacted statute. At least as early as
Estate of Johnson (1903), 139 Cal. 532, 534 [73 P. 424, 96 Am.
St.Rep. 161], this court said, ,. A court will not decide a con- .
stitutional question unless such construction is absolutely necessary" (see, also, Marin Municipal Water Dist. v. Dolge
(1916),172 Cal. 724, 726 [158 P.187]) and as recently as Hurd
v. Hodge (May 3, 1948), 334 U.S. 24 [68 8.0t. 847, 92 L.Ed.
- ] , the United States Supreme Court in determining one of
the racial restriction casrs said: "Upon full consideration,
however, we have found it unnecessary to resolve the constitution.al issue which petitioners advanc~; for we have concluded
that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants bv the
courts of the District of Columbia is improper for' other
li"I'
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r"nsolls hPTl'illllftl'T ~;tat('d.'''' 'fh(' footl101(' rl'fl'rred to rpads:
"It is a well-established prineipl(' that 1his Court will not
deeicie cOllstitutional questions where other grounds are avail·
able and dispositive of the issues of the case. Recent expres·
sions of that policy are to be found in Alma Motor Co. v.
Timken-Detroit Axle Co. [1946], 329 U.S. 129 [67 L.Ed. 231,
9] L.Ed. 128] ; Rescue Army v. Mlt1l1'(!il)ol COllrt [1947], 331
U.S. 549 [67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666]."
This case fits squarely into the policy above stated; we deem
it improper to now strike that policy dowl1. It seems to us
that good judicial practice, as well as legal precedent, requires
that we dispose of the case on the now thoroughly established
grounds which are set forth hereinabove rather than to gratuitously make opportunity for either reaching or declaring
views on the suggested constitutional question.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment is reversed..
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
GIBSON, C. J .-1 concur in the judgment of reversal and
am in accord with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion that the Alien Land Act incorporated the provisions of
the treaty between the United States and Japan as it existed
on April 5, 1911, and that the abrogation of the treaty in 1940
had no effect on the operation of the act, which, therefore, still
permits a lease of real property by a corporation such as the
one involved here. 1 also agree that as a general rule we
should not decide constitutional questions if the case can be
disposed of on other grounds, but under the circumstances
presented here and because of the position which I took in
Takahashi v. Fish d'; Game Commission, 30 Cal.2d 719, 737
[185 P.2d 805], 1 deem it proper to state that I am in full
agreement with the additional ground for reversal set forth
in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Carter and Mr. Justice Traynor.
CARTER, J., and TRAYNOR, J.-We concur in the judgment.
As we view the present case it presents substantially the
same issues of constitutionality as were involved in Takahashi v. Fish &; Game Commission,30 Ca1.2d 719 [185 P.2d
805], reversed 333 U.S. 853 [68 8. Ct. 731, 92 L.Ed - ] . In
our opinion the unconst.itntionality of the provisions of the
California Alien Lund Act involved in this case is d('arly
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dCIIIOllst rntf'd hy tllC disscnting opinion of Mr. ,J IIstil'C ('art rr
in t Jlat cmiC. 1ft hese constitutional questions hall lIot pr('viousl.\· b:'CII eOllsidered by this \!ourt it. might bc possihll'
to cons1rue thrsl' provisions in such a way as to avoid COI1stitutional implications. In view of previolls decisions of this
court, however, such constitutional implications cannot bt'
avoided. We wish to make it clear, therefore, that we still
adht're to the views expressed in the dissenting opinion in
thc Takahashi case.
There can be no doubt that a state cannot deny "to lawful
inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary
means of earning a livelihood." (Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 39 [36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131, Ann.Cas. 1917B 283, L.R.A.
1916D 545].) Thus persons may not be barred because of
theil' race or nationalit.y from employment in the ordinary
industry or business of another. It is common knowledge that
it is necessary to the conduct of an ordinary industry or business enterprise to own or lease the property in which the industry or business is conducted. If the state could prohibit
Illirns ineligible to citizenship from owning or leasing real
property it would thert'by e1it'ctively prevent such persons
from conducting ordinary industrial or business enterprises.
Such a discrimination, if valid, would confine the aliell's right
to engage in an ordinary means of earning a livelihood til serving as an employee or servant of a citizen or of a foreign national permitted to own or lease real property or of corporations owned by a majority of such citizens or nationals. The
rtreet of such legislation is to impose upon the alien ineligible
to citizenship an economic status inferior to all others earning
a li\"ing in the state. Such a discrimination cannot be sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. Even in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
lOi, 221 [44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255], the United States Supreme Court recognized that a state could not discriminate
Ilg-aiust aliens ineligible to citizenship if that" discrimination
was imposed upon the conduct of ordinary private enterprise
cO\'ering the entire field of industry with the exception of enterprises that were relatively very small."
. In our view the statute here involved is clearly unconstitu!:Ional. and should, tllerefore, be stricken down.
Hespondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 8,
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